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I. INTRODUCTION 
This reply brief tracks Appellants' Opening Brief dated November 2, 2015, and addresse
s 
key points in the response brief filed by Respondent on January 26, 2016. 
It is axiomatic that Dr. Allen had an extensive drug history over the course of a decad
e 
untii he was turned into the I3oard of Podiatry, and that despite his drug history, he co
nducted 
surgery and practiced podiatry presumably under the influence of drugs, given the nu
mber of 
pills he took per day. It is fu1iher axiomatic that his drug addiction was known to Dr.
 Ozeran, 
another member of Respondent, as well as Richard Snyder, the manager of Respondent, 
and that, 
despite his disingenuous response to the contrary, Dr. Allen again was taking narco
tic pain 
medications after he returned from rehabilitation in 2009. 
Respondent Syringa Surgical Center argues that there is no material issue of fact becaus
e 
there is no evidence Dr. Allen was impaired at the time of the surgery on Mr. Wainio. L
ikewise, 
Respondent argues that Dr. Allen was not an agent of Respondent in any event. Re
spondent 
glosses over all of the indicia of an agency relationship which implicates Responde
nt in Dr. 
Allen's negligence both before the surgery, and at the time Dr. Allen performed the su
rgery on 
Mr. Wainio in the Respondent facilities. The Respondent's arguments are a continue
d folly in 
support of the district court's erroneous conclusion that there was no material issu
e of fact 
regarding Respondent's liability. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO DETERMINE THAT
 DR. 
ALLEN WAS NOT AN ACTUAL OR APPARENT AGENT OF SYRINGA 
SURGICAL CENTER 
Whether Dr. Allen was an actual or apparent agent of Respondent is a question of fact. 
It 
is also a question of fact whether Dr. Allen was negligent while acting within the c
ourse and 
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scope of his express or apparent agency. Questions of fact are to be decided by
 a Jury. 
American West Enterprises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 316 P.3d 662 (2013). 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no material issues of fact and th
e 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c). All disputed fac
ts are to 
be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences tha
t can be 
drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Kiebert v. G
oss, 144 
Idaho 225, 227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007) citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho S
tate Tax 
Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). 
Respondent asserts that "all of the conduct of which the Appellants complain- approvin
g 
or agreeing to perform surgery on A1r. Wainio despite the alleged absence of per
fusion -
occurred prior to (January 4 and 18, 201 OJ Mr. Wainio ever entering Syringa Surgica
l Center 
on January 21, 2010." Respondent's Brief, p. 14. The problem with Respondent's arg
ument is 
twofold. 
First, as previously pointed out, the record is replete with facts that show a set o
f 
circumstances under which it was reasonable for Mr. Wainio to believe that Dr. Alle
n was an 
agent of Respondent. On January 18, 2010, while meeting with Dr. Allen, in Dr. Allen'
s offices, 
Mr. Wainio filled out documents provided to him by Dr. Allen's staff Mr. Wainio fi
lled out a 
"patient information sheet" with the name "Syringa Surgery Center" at the top R. p
. 2908; a 
"Patient's Rights and Responsibilities" document also with the name "Syringa Surgery
 Center" 
at the top, R. p. 291 O; and a "consent" form, again, with the name "Syringa Surgery C
enter" at 
the top of the page. R. p. 2911. There is no evidence of a separate consent form for Dr
. Allen to 
perform the surgery, or a separate set of rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis Dr. Allen
. These 
2 
disputed facts are material to the question of whether Allen was Syringa's express o
r apparent 
agent, thereby creating liability for Respondent. 
Respondent ignores the plethora of facts that cast a spotlight on the interrelationship
 of 
Syringa and Dr. Allen, and urges this Court to rely instead on Mr. Wainio's statement t
hat he did 
not choose Dr. Allen because of Syringa. Mr. Wainio's statement that he did not c
hoose Dr. 
Allen because of Syringa does not answer the question of whether Mr. Wainio believ
ed by the 
objective evidence that Dr. Allen was Syringa's agent. 
Second, Dr. Allen performed the surgery on January 21, 2010, in Syringa Surgi
cal 
Center. Respondent argues that there is no evidence that Dr. Allen performed the s
urgery on 
Syringa's behalf or in Syringa's name. Respondent fails to even cursorily address th
e fact that 
the stated purpose of the LLC which is to operate a surgical center for a profit (R. p. 
2877) and, 
that Dr. Allen was required to fulfill the Respondent's purpose, by maintaining a
 full time 
practice and conducting surgeries at the center. R. p. 2864. 
Additionally, there is no basis to Respondent's argument that Dr. Allen was not acting
 as 
an agent of Syringa at any time Appellants allege that Dr. Allen was negligent. Re
spondent's 
partner, Dr. Ozeran, and manager, Richard Snyder, knew of Dr. Allen's prescription
 drug and 
Propofol abuse but did not prevent Dr. Allen from performing surgery at Syringa Surg
ical Center 
until a third party took the matter to the Idaho Board of Podiatry. Once Dr. Allen retu
rned from 
rehab, there were no additional safeguards put in place to ensure he was not practicin
g medicine 
while under the influence of drugs. Although Dr. Allen was being drug tested, the
 drug tests 
were clearly inadequate to detect the drugs he abused, as evidence by the fact that
 Dr. Allen 
tested negative for opiates while using hydrocodone prescribed by his dentist, Dr. Ben
gston. 
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Appellants allege that Dr. Allen was negligent by determining Mr. Wainio was a 
candidate for surgery on January 4, 2010 and then carrying through with that surgery on January 
21, 2010, which was performed at Syringa Surgical Center. Thus Appellants have alleged that 
Dr. Allen's negligence occurred in part at Syringa Surgical Center. Thus, it remains a question of 
fact to be determined by the jury whether Dr. Allen v1as acting as an agent of Respondent at all 
times he was negligent, which absolutely includes the negligence of providing health care to Mr. 
Wainio while under the influence of drugs. 
B. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO STRIKE THE EVIDENCE 
OF APPELLANTS' EXPERT, DR. WISCHMEYER, REGARDING DR. ALLEN'S 
DRUG USE. 
The district court erred by striking the evidence of Appellant's expe1i Dr. Wischmeyer, 
regarding Dr. Allen's drug use because the district court created its own standard for the 
admissibility of expert testimony. As it had previously done in front of the district court, the 
Respondent continues to improperly argue regarding the credibility of the evidence and witness 
testimony Dr. Wischmeyer relies upon, in direct contravention of Nield v. Pocatello Health 
Servs .. Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 714, (2014). In addition to faulting the credibility of the 
evidence of Dr. Allen's drug use, Respondent also mischaracterizes the same evidence and 
ignores important opinions in Dr. Wischmeyer's Affidavits. Rspt. Syringa Surgical Ctr., LLC's 
Brief on Appeal, January 26, 2016, p. 21. 
The Respondent's arguments should be rejected and this Court should uphold the 
standard for admissibility of expert testimony as set forth in Nield, supra. It was an error of law 
to create a new standard for the admissibility of expert testimony and determining whether the 
probative value of evidence is outweighed by its prejudice wherein the district court improperly 
weighed the credibility of the evidence Dr. Wischmeyer relied upon. As a result, this matter 
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should be remanded back to the district court for findings regarding the admissibility of Dr. 
Wischrneyer's testimony according to the proper standards for the admissibility of expert 
testimony, set forth in Nield, supra. 
1. The Evidentiary Standard Utilized By The District Court, In Which 
The District Court Weighed The Credibility Of Evidence And 
VVit11esses, \Tiolated The Standard Previously Set 
In Nield V. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc. 
Court 
The Respondent does not dispute the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony 
set forth in Nield, 156 Idaho 802. Under Nield, the district court is to act as a gatekeeper rather 
than a fact finder in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Id, at 811; see also United 
States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir., 2006). The determination of the 
admissibility of expert testimony is not an adversarial process. Nield, 156 Idaho at 811. The 
court should not weigh the credibility of the facts forming the basis of the expert's opinion, but 
rather, should only consider whether the facts, if taken as true, support the expert's testimony 
rendering it admissible. Id, [ emphasis added]. An expert's ultimate conclusion is not 
determinative of admissibility; rather it is the legitimacy of the expert's reasoning and 
methodology. Id, at 816; citing Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140, 219 P.3d 453, 464 
(2009). In evaluating the admissibility of an expert's testimony, the court should not weigh the 
testimony of the expert against other witnesses or make determinations as to the credibility of the 
expert, rather the expert's opinion should be judged on its own merits against the requirements of 
I.R.E. 702. Nield, 156 Idaho at 816. Expert testimony that is based upon facts in the record is not 
speculative and is therefore admissible because it is helpful to the trier of fact. Id, at 816-18. 
Notably, the Respondent does not dispute that the above is the proper standard for determining 
the admissibility of expert testimony nor that this standard applies in this case. Thus, the district 
court was required to treat as fact the testimony of Bea Shatto ("Ms. Shatto") that when Dr. 
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Allen treated Mr. Wainio on January 4, 2010, Dr. Allen appeared overly euphoric, exhibited 
jerky movements, and had glittery eyes. R. p. 2145. 
Despite Respondents' best efforts to misconstrue the evidence forming the basis of Dr. 
Wischmeyer's opinions, his opinions are supported by substantial evidence, which, when taken 
as true as required by Nield, provides more than adequate foundation for Dr. \Viscl:nneyer' s 
testimony. Importantly, the district court did not strike any of the Affidavits of Dr. Wischmeyer 
or Ms. Shatto, rather the district court noted that the Affidavits were necessary to the 
determination of the admissibility of Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony. R. p. 2255. In forming his 
opinion, Dr. Wischmeyer relied on the testimony of Ms. Shatto regarding Dr. Allen's appearance 
during Harvey Wainio's ("Mr. Wainio") initial visit with Dr. Allen on January 4, 2010. R. p. 
2150. Ms. Shatto testified that Dr. Allen appeared overly euphoric, exhibited jerky movements, 
and had glittery eyes. R. p. 2145. Dr. Wischmeyer testified that Ms. Shatto's observations of Dr. 
Allen were consistent with the use of opiods and Propofol, the drugs which Dr. Allen had a 
history of abusing. R. p. 2153. Based on Ms. Shatto' s testimony, as well as the other information 
Dr. Wischmeyer considered set forth below, Dr. Wischmeyer testified that it was his opinion on 
a more probable than not basis to a reasonable degree of medical probability or certainty that Dr. 
Allen was under the influence of drugs at the time he treated Mr. Wainio on January 4, 2010 and 
that Dr. Allen's cognitive ability on that date related to his ability to evaluate Mr. Wainio's pedal 
pulses was impaired as a result of his drug use. R. p. 2151. 
The Respondent incorrectly argues that there is no direct evidence Dr. Allen was under 
the influence of drugs at any time he treated Mr. Wainio because of a discrepancy in Dr. 
Wischmeyer's Affidavit of February 3, 2014 wherein Dr. Wischmeyer referred to the visit Ms. 
Shatto attended as having occurred on January 18, 2010, rather than January 4, 2010. Rspt. 
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Syringa Surgical Ctr., LLC's Brief on Appeal, January 26, 2016, p. 21. In order to make this 
argument, the Respondent intentionally ignored the February 12, 2014 Declaration of Dr. 
Wischmeyer in which Dr. Wischmeyer explained that he erroneously referred to the visit Ms. 
Shatto attended as having occurred on January 18, 2010. R. p. 2224. Dr. Wischmeyer corrected 
the misstatement of dates in his previous Affidavit stating that ,vhen he referred to the date of 
January 18, 2010, on pages 4 and 9 of his previous Affidavit, he had intended to refer to the date 
of January 4, 2010. Id. He further explained that the visit he was referring to on pages 4 and 9 of 
his previous Affidavit, was the visit in which Dr. Allen palpated Mr. Wainio's dorsal pedal pulse 
and posterior tibial pulses and claimed they were +2 over 4 bilaterally. Id. Again, this 
corresponds with the date of January 4, 2010, which is the same date Ms. Shatto testified she was 
present during Dr. Allen's examination of Mr. Wainio. R. p. 2145. The Respondent concedes 
that Ms. Shatto was present during Mr. Wainio's appointment with Dr. Allen on January 4, 2010. 
Rspt. Syringa Surgical Ctr., LLC 's Brief on Appeal, January 26, 2016, p. 26. 
Dr. Wischmeyer's explanation that he was referring to the January 4, 2010 initial visit on 
pages 4 and 9 of his February 3, 2014 Affidavit is consistent with Dr. Allen's medical records 
which indicate that Dr. Allen palpated Mr. Wainio's pedal pulses on January 4, 2010. R. p. 2224. 
Appellants have alleged that Dr. Allen was negligent on January 4, 2010 because Mr. Wainio's 
vascular system in his lower extremities was in such a condition that he was not a candidate for 
the surgery that Dr. Allen performed on January 21, 2010 and it would have been impossible for 
Dr. Allen to palpate Mr. Wainio's pedal pulses as Dr. Allen had claimed to do on January 4, 
2010. R. p. 50-51 R. p. 2224. It was during this same visit that Dr. Allen palpated Mr. Wainio's 
pedal pulses despite it being impossible for him to do so that Ms. Shatto observed that Dr. Allen 
appeared overly euphoric, exhibited jerky movements, and had glittery eyes. R. p. 2145. Thus, 
7 
Dr. Wischmeyer' s opinion that Dr. Allen was under the influence of drugs at the time he 
provided negligent care and treatment to Mr. Wainio on January 4, 2010 is supported by direct 
evidence of Dr. Allen's behavior and appearance at the time he provided the care and treatment 
on January 4, 2010. Based in part on Ms. Shatto's testimony, Dr. Wischmeyer testified that on a 
111ore probable than not basis to a reasonable degree of medical probability Dr . .tA,Jlen \Vas under 
the influence of drugs at the time he treated Mr. Wainio on January 4, 2010 and that Dr. Allen's 
cognitive ability on that date related to his ability to evaluate Mr. Wainio's pedal pulses was 
impaired as a result of his drug use. R. p. 2151. 
The Respondent also argues that Dr. Wischmeyer's opinion was triple qualified and did 
not meet the required standard of a more probable than not basis. However, the Respondent is 
referring to Dr. Wischmeyer's Affidavit of October 19, 2012 which was submitted in support of 
Appellants' motion seeking discovery of information regarding Dr. Allen's drug use. R. p. 2145. 
As the district court noted, Dr. Wischmeyer's subsequent Affidavit of February 3, 2014 
contained Dr. Wischmeyer' s opinions after he reviewed all of the evidence discovered to that 
date regarding Dr. Allen's drug use. R. p. 3033. In the February 3, 2014 Affidavit, Dr. 
Wischmeyer's opinions were offered to the required standard of more probable than not to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty. Id, R. p. 2151. Thus, Dr. Wischmeyer's previous 
opinion, regardless of whether it was "triple qualified" has no bearing on the admissibility of his 
ultimate opinions set forth in his February 3, 2014 Affidavit. 
Ms. Shatto' s testimony was not the only evidence Dr. Wischmeyer relied upon in support 
of his opinions. Dr. Wischmeyer had also reviewed the second deposition of Dr. Allen 
addressing his drug abuse history, the depositions of Dr. Allen's wife, Heidi Pritchett and 
Monica Broemeling who were Dr. Allen's employees, Richard Snyder, who was the Director of 
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Syringa Surgical Center, and the deposition and records of Dr. Bengston, who was Dr. Allen's 
dentist. R. p. 2150. Further, Dr. Wischmeyer also reviewed the prescription records of Dr. 
Allen's mother related to drugs that Dr. Allen had diverted for his own use, Dr. Allen's Idaho 
Board of Podiatry file, and Dr. Allen's drug treatment records from his rehab facility. R. p. 2150-
51. Dr. \1/isch1ne)rer applied his personal expertise and experience to the e·vidence he considered, 
which evidence was normally relied upon by experts in his field. R. p. 2150-53. The district corni 
stated that it had no questions regarding Dr. Wischmeyer's credentials as an expert or the 
accuracy of his statement that his opinions were supported by literature and peer reviewed 
studies. R. p. 3033. According to Dr. Wischmeyer, the evidence he relied upon, including the 
testimony of Ms. Shatto, and the evidence which Respondent argued unequivocally showed Dr. 
Allen had not relapsed, supported his conclusion that Dr. Allen was under the influence of drugs 
at the time he provided care and treatment to Mr. Wainio. R. p. 2150. 
The extra-jurisdictional authority cited to by the Respondent supports the admission of 
Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony when the facts of the instant case are applied to the holdings of 
those cases. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Sheffield, 405 So. 2d 1314, 1316 (Miss., 1981)(evidence of a 
physician's drug use inadmissible because there was no evidence the physician was under the 
influence of drugs at the time of the alleged negligence); Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 
659, 661-62 (S.D., 1986)(evidence of a physician's alcohol abuse inadmissible because there was 
no evidence that alcohol had any effect on the alleged negligent care); Ornelas v. Fry, 151 Ariz. 
324,328, 727 P.2d 819,823 (Ct. App., 1986)(evidence of a physician's alcohol use inadmissible 
because there was no evidence that the alleged negligent care was impacted by the use of 
alcohol). In the Shamburger case, the South Dakota Supreme Court explained it was upholding 
the previous ruling of the trial court excluding evidence of a physician's alcohol use because, 
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"there was no evidence that alcohol had any effect on diagnosis, treatment, preoperative or 
postoperative care." Shamburger, 380 N.W.2d at 661-62. Unlike the above cited cases, in the 
instant case there is direct evidence that Dr. Allen was under the influence of drugs at the time he 
diagnosed and treated Mr. Wainio during Mr. Wainio's initial visit on January 4, 2010. R. p. 
January 4, 2010 were consistent with the use of opiods and Propofol and that Dr. Allen's 
cognitive ability on that date related to his ability to evaluate Mr. Wainio's pedal pulses was 
impaired as a result of his drug use. R. p. 2151-53. This is direct evidence that Dr. Allen was 
under the influence of drugs at the time he provided care to Mr. Wainio on January 4, 2010 and 
that Dr. Allen's drug use impacted his diagnosis and treatment of Mr. Wainio. Thus Dr. 
Wischmeyer's testimony would be admissible under each of the extra-jurisdictional cases cited 
to by the Respondent. 
As set forth in the Nield case, the district comi was not permitted to weigh the credibility 
of the evidence and witnesses in determining the admissibility of Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony 
but that is exactly what the district court did. Nield, 156 Idaho at 816. Addressing the Affidavits 
of Dr. Wischmeyer and Ms. Shatto, the district court stated, 
... Plaintiffs have presented no evidence Dr. Allen was under the influence of any 
drugs in January 2010 when Dr. Allen says he palpated pedal pulse in Wainio' s 
right foot. Rather, Plaintiffs' theory rests solely on Dr. Wischmeyer's conjecture 
and speculation that Allen likely relapsed, despite the absence of adequate factual 
evidence upon which such a conclusion could lie. 
R. p. 2257. The district court went on to criticize the reliability of the evidence Dr. Wischmeyer 
relied upon, including challenging Dr. Wischmeyer for failing to address Respondent's argument 
that none of the witnesses expressed concern with Dr. Allen's post-rehabilitation behavior or 
treatment of patients and further that Dr. Allen's drug tests were all negative. Id. However, the 
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witness depositions and drug tests were anything but conclusive evidence that Dr. Allen was not 
under the influence of drugs on January 2010, highlighting the fact that the district court 
should not have assumed the role of fact finder. For instance, Dr. Allen's drug tests tested for 
opiate use. R. p. 2989-95. Dr. Allen was drug tested four times between September 21, 2011 and 
November 28, 2011 and again on February 21, 2012 and ]\1.arch 7, 2012, and all the tests came 
back negative for opiate use despite the fact that Dr. Allen was prescribed opiates four times 
between September 21, 2011 and November 28, 2011 and received another prescription for 
opiates just four days prior to being drug tested on February 21, 2012. R. p. 2988-95. Thus, the 
drug tests were unable to detect Dr. Allen's use of opiates despite it being undisputed that Dr. 
Allen was taking opiates at the time the drug tests were being administered. The district court 
would later acknowledge this fact in its written opinion regarding Appellants' motion in limine 
to admit the evidence of Dr. Allen's drug use. R. p. 3034. 
The district court continued to improperly weigh the credibility of the evidence when it 
ruled on Appellants' motion in limine to admit the evidence of Dr. Allen's drug use. The district 
court again faulted Dr. Wischmeyer for not considering evidence the district court believed 
suggested Dr. Allen had not relapsed, clearly ignoring those portions of Dr. Wischmeyer's 
Affidavits addressing the inadequacy of Dr. Allen's inpatient drug rehab stay and drug testing. R. 
p. 3034. Further, the district court criticized the evidence Dr. Wischmeyer was relying upon, 
stating that it was not credible. R. p. 3032-33. In support of this criticism, the district questioned 
the accuracy of Ms. Shatto's statements that Dr. Allen seemed overly happy, his eyes seemed 
glimmery, and his depth perception appeared impaired. R. p. 3034. 
The district court created its own standard for the admissibility of expert testimony when 
it weighed the credibility of the evidence and witnesses in evaluating the admissibility of Dr. 
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Wischmeyer's testimony regarding Dr. Allen's drug use. It was an error of law for the district 
court to do so. Therefore, Appellants respectfully request the Court reverse the district court's 
ruling holding Dr. Wischmeyer' s testimony inadmissible and remand this matter back to the 
district court for a determination of the admissibility of Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony according 
to the proper standard set forth in Nield. 
2. The District Court Committed Error By Applying An Incorrect 
Evidentiary Standard The Evidentiary Standard To Measure The 
Probative Value Of Testimony Against The Potential Prejudice Of 
Such Evidence. 
The Respondent does not dispute the standard for measuring the probative value of 
evidence against its unfair prejudice as set forth in Appellants' brief. When weighing the 
probative value of evidence against its unfair prejudice under ER 403, a court may not consider 
the credibility of the evidence. United States v. Evans, 728 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 2013). The 
court must accredit the evidence with the probative value the evidence has if the evidence is fact. 
Id. In order to be "unfairly prejudicial" the evidence must suggest to the jury that they decide the 
case on an improper basis. Id. citing Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 1981). 
"Unfairly prejudicial" evidence is evidence that haims a party "not because of inferences that can 
reasonably be drawn from the facts, but because it inflames the jury and rouses them to 
'overmastering hostility'." State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88, 785 P.2d 647, 652 (Ct. App. 1989). 
ER 403 is an extreme remedy to be used sparingly and only in circumstances where the 
prejudicial danger substantially outweighs the probative value of evidence. United States v. 
Reyes, 660 F.3d 454, 464 (9th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298, 1302 
(9th Cir. 1995); and State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho at 88. 
As set forth above, it is clear that the district court weighed the credibility of the 
witnesses and evidence that Dr. Wischmeyer relied upon in forming his opinion that Dr. Allen 
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was under the influence of drugs at the time he provided care and treatment to Mr. Wainio. R. p. 
2257, 3032-34. It is also clear that the district court questioned the credibility of such evidence, 
and that this credibility determination improperly factored into the district court's determination 
that Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony was more prejudicial than probative. R. p. 3034-35. Appellants 
respectfully request the Court reject the I.R.E. 403 balancing test engaged in by the district court, 
overturn the court's finding that Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony was more prejudicial than 
probative, and remand this matter back to the district court for a determination of the 
admissibility of the testimony without weighing the credibility or the testimony or its foundation. 
3. The District Court Should Not Be Permitted To Violate The 
Constitutionally Protected Right To A Trial By Jury By Assuming The 
Role Of Fact Finder Determining The Admissibility Of Dr. 
Wischmeyer's Testimony. 
The Respondent does not address the implications of the district court's assumption of 
the role of fact finder in determining the admissibility of Dr. Wischmeyer' s testimony on 
Appellants' right to a trial by jury. Instead, the Respondent continues to argue about the 
credibility of the evidence and witnesses Dr. Wischmeyer relied upon in forming his opinions. 
As set forth above, the issue of the credibility of the evidence Dr. Wischmeyer relied upon was 
not properly before the district for consideration when the district court determined the 
admissibility of Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony. Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho 
802, 811, 332 P.3d 714, (2014); United States v. Evans, 728 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 2013). The 
district court was required to treat as fact that on January 4, 2010, when Dr. Allen palpated Mr. 
Wainio's pedal pulses, Dr. Allen appeared overly euphoric, exhibited jerky movements, and had 
glittery eyes. R. p. 2145. This was evidence of Dr. Allen's behavior and appearance at the time 
he diagnosed and treated Mr. Wainio during Mr. Wainio's initial visit that indicated Dr. Allen 
was under the influence of drugs. Not only do Appellant's have the constitutional right to a trial 
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by jury that considers the credibility of such evidence but the community has a 
right to 
participate in the justice system by considering the credibility of such evidence. The Ap
pellants' 
and the community's participation in the justice system should not be limited a judicial
 process 
that only includes evidence deemed credible by the Court. 
C. RESPONDENT'S R~GARD!NG ESTARLISHMENT OF
 
SYRINGA SURGICAL CENTER'S STANDARD OF CARE PERTAINING 
TO DR. ALLEN'S DRUG ABUSE AND COMPLICITY THEREWITH 
WAS BROUGHT FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND IS 
MISPLACED 
The Appellate Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Murra
y 
v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99, 101, 106 P.3d 425, 427 (2004), citing Row v. State, 135 Id
aho 573, 
21 P.3d 895 (2001). The Respondents raise, for the first time on appeal, the issue of
 whether 
Appellants are required to show Syringa Surgical Center, LLC breached a local standar
d of care 
regarding its complicity with Dr. Allen's drug use in order to maintain an ind
ependent 
negligence action against Syringa. Respondent's Brief, p. 18. 
This Court should strike the Respondent's arguments regarding whether Appellants a
re 
required to show their expert was familiar with a "local standard of care" in order to s
ustain an 
independent cause of action against Respondent for negligence. Whether or not Appe
llants are 
required to show that Respondent breached an applicable standard of health care practic
e was not 
previously raised on summary judgment in this case. R. p. 2649-2658. The only m
ention 
Respondent makes of Dr. Allen's drug use in its summary judgment briefing is to stat
e that the 
evidence of such has been dismissed. R. p. 2650. 
Respondent's discussion regarding Appellants' expert witnesses' lack of testimony th
at 
Syringa Surgical Center violated the standard of care independent of Dr. Allen's
 actions, 
Respondent purposefully does not address Dr. Wischmeyer's on-point testimony. R.
 p. 2653. 
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Finally, when Respondent discusses LC. § 6-1012, it limits its argument whether Syringa 
Surgical Center can be found liable to theories of agency. It does not address Appellants' 
independent cause of action. Id. 
At the district court, the Respondent did not move for summary judgment on the grounds 
that Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony failed to meet the requirements of LC. §6-1012 and/ or that 
Appellants had no expert testimony addressing the standard of care as it applied to an 
independent theory of liability against the Respondent. Nor did the district court grant 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment on such grounds. R. p. 3037-41. Respondent's only 
challenge to the admissibility of the evidence of Dr. Allen's drug use and Syringa Surgical 
Center's liability arising from its complicity therewith, was on the grounds of relevancy. 
Respondent argued that there was no link between Dr. Allen's drug use and the alleged 
negligence. 
There is no information in the record before this Court upon which this Court could rule 
on the issue of whether or not Appellants have or even need expert testimony regarding the 
standard of care applicable to the independent theory of liability against Syringa Surgical Center 
arising from its complicity with Dr. Allen's drug use. There is no determination from the district 
court whether Appellants' independent theory of liability pertaining to Syringa Surgical Center is 
an allegation of medical negligence to which I. C. § 6-1012 even applies. 
This Court should not allow Respondent to improperly inject an issue into this matter that 




The issue of agency is a question of fact. Moreover, Respondent's independent 
negligence is also an issue of fact. Respondents attempt to gloss over Dr. Allen's significant and 
prolonged drug abuse and, more importantly, his continued drug use after he claims to have gone 
to rehab and stopped taking drugs. 
Additionally, Respondents have provided no argument or evidence to show how the 
district court applied the proper standard when determining the admissibility of the evidence. It 
is Appellants' contention that the district court applied an improper standard and the case must 
be remanded. 
Finally, raising an issue for the first time on appeal is improper. Respondent's argument 
regarding the Appellants' duty to provide expert testimony on the local standard of care is 
misplaced and improper and should be stricken. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of March, 2016. 
THE MARKAM GROUP 
Kamitomo ' 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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